

# **Uncertainty in climate policy and the energy industry**

Energy, 2025

---

Hugo Morão

October 2026

ISEG – Lisbon School of Economics & Management  
University of Lisbon

# Climate policy uncertainty may matter for the energy industry

- Climate change and sustainability imperatives make **policy uncertainty** increasingly important
- Governments must craft climate policies that meet targets **without disrupting existing industries**
- The energy industry sits in the middle of these decisions, balancing economic benefits and climate goals
- The trade-off between environmental stewardship and economic stability shapes policy, yet remains **empirically underexplored**

## Question

How does climate policy uncertainty (CPU) affect the energy industry? Do sectoral responses differ across turnover, labour and prices?

# What the paper does

- **Portugal's energy industry**: new sectoral survey data, monthly, January 2005 to December 2022
- Six variables: **domestic and non-domestic turnover, gross wages, hours worked, and output prices** at home and abroad
- A **Bayesian structural VAR**; the CPU shock is identified with a **correlation restriction**, using a Portuguese CPU index (Morão 2025) as a proxy (Ludvigson et al. 2021)
- Impulse responses, variance decomposition and historical decomposition, then sensitivity checks

## Why Portugal

A rapid transition towards renewables alongside traditional sources such as natural gas, and EU membership, so national initiatives interact with EU directives.

## Preview of results

- **Turnover:** a CPU shock raises domestic turnover, strongly and persistently; the non-domestic response is positive but imprecise
- **Prices:** output prices rise at home and abroad, **more strongly in foreign markets**
- **Labour:** wages are unchanged; hours worked increase only marginally
- **History:** CPU shocks account for a sizeable share of past fluctuations; their contribution changes from dampening to positive over time
- The paper reports that the main finding holds across the sensitivity checks

1. **CPU indices and their consequences:** Gavriilidis (2021) builds a news-based index and links CPU to lower CO<sub>2</sub> emissions with a recursive SVAR; Apergis et al. (2023) links CPU to travel demand
2. **Financial markets:** CPU and market volatility, in stock and bond markets (Yu et al. 2023; Lasisi et al. 2022), carbon markets (Wu et al. 2022) and oil (Salisu et al. 2023); since the Paris Agreement, CPU has played a bigger role in oil-market fear (Xiao and Liu 2022)
3. **Firm behaviour:** CPU raises corporate (green) innovation (Zhu et al. 2023; Huo et al. 2023) but may lower it (Mao and J. Huang 2022); it lowers investment (Gao and Zhang 2023; T. Huang and Sun 2023); firms adopt pollution-reducing technology (Wang 2022); carbon-intensive sectors lose market value (Khalil and Strobel 2023)

- **Real-sector evidence:** how CPU shocks affect turnover, labour and prices in a single industry, complementing firm-level studies and financial-market studies
- **New data:** the Portuguese CPU index (Morão 2025) with novel Portuguese sectoral survey data
- **Identification:** the CPU index enters as a **proxy** for the structural shock (Ludvigson et al. 2021), not as a recursively ordered variable; the paper compares with the recursive alternative (Kilian et al. 2022)


## Closest papers

Gavriilidis (2021) and Apergis et al. (2023) study consequences of CPU; Morão (2025) studies the macroeconomic effects of CPU in Portugal.

## **Data and Method**

---

# Data: six indices for Portugal's energy industry




Notes: Baseline series in  $100 \times \log$ ; panels in the order of the list at right.

- Monthly, January 2005 to December 2022
- **Domestic turnover**  $t_t$ : revenue from the industry in Portugal
- **Non-domestic turnover**  $t_t^*$ : exports and global transactions
- **Gross wages and salaries**  $w_t$
- **Hours worked**  $h_t$
- **Output prices:** home  $\pi_t$  and foreign  $\pi_t^*$  markets

Data sources

# The shock proxy: a news-based CPU index for Portugal



Notes: Climate policy uncertainty index for Portugal, index points;  
dots mark events labelled in the figure.

- Built as in Baker et al. (2016): counts articles with at least one keyword from each of three groups, **climate**, **policy**, **uncertainty**
- Index developed in Morão (2025)
- Used as a **proxy**, not as an endogenous variable of the VAR

Keyword list

# Model: a Bayesian structural VAR

Six endogenous variables,  $y_t = [t_t, t_t^*, w_t, h_t, \pi_t, \pi_t^*]'$ , and  $p$  lags:

$$y_t' \mathcal{D}_0 = \mathcal{C} + \mathcal{D}_1 y_{t-1}' + \cdots + \mathcal{D}_p y_{t-p}' + \eta_t', \quad \eta_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, I)$$

$\eta_t$ : structural shocks;  $\mathcal{D}_0$ : contemporaneous interactions (invertible). Reduced-form innovations  $\varepsilon_t' = \eta_t' \mathcal{D}_0^{-1}$ .

- **Six lags**, a constant, and the Portuguese Economic Policy Uncertainty index (Morão 2024) as exogenous term; variables in log annual rates
- **Independent Normal–Wishart prior**, similar to the Minnesota prior (Litterman 1986) but not conditioning the prior for  $\beta$  on  $\Sigma$
- Gibbs sampler (Dieppe et al. 2016): 5,000 iterations, the first 2,000 discarded
- Output: impulse responses (IRF), forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD), historical decomposition (HD)

Hyperparameters

## Identification: a correlation restriction on the CPU shock

- Recursive identification rests on restrictive assumptions that may not match economic intuition (Kilian et al. 2022)
- Instead, following Ludvigson et al. (2021), the CPU shock  $\eta_{1,t}$  must be correlated with the index  $S_t$ :

$$\rho_1 = \text{corr}(S_t, \eta_{1,t}) \geq \bar{c}$$


- $S_t$ : the Portuguese CPU index;  $\bar{c}$ : a threshold correlation
- Ensures a strong link between the shock and the index while leaving the relations among the endogenous variables flexible
- Impulse responses are normalized to a **10% rise in foreign output prices on impact**; bands are 68% credible

Recursive alternative

# Results

---

# A CPU shock raises turnover and prices; wages do not move



Notes: Normalized to a 10% rise in foreign prices on impact. Line: posterior median; shaded: 68% credible bands.

- **Domestic turnover:** strong and persistent increase, about 3.6% on impact and still above zero after a year (read from the figure)
- **Non-domestic turnover:** positive but wide bands
- **Wages:** no response
- **Hours:** marginally significant increase
- **Prices:** both rise persistently; foreign is larger

# Prices and turnover: the paper's reading

## Turnover and labour

- Domestic turnover: firms may read uncertainty as foreshadowing favourable conditions for sustainability and invest in low-carbon technology
- Non-domestic: firms may already face global regulation, or wait and see
- Wages: firms seem to prioritize capital investment over labour costs
- Hours: a small uptick, possibly from adopting green technology or reconvertng processes

## Output prices

- Both rise: a response to higher carbon-reduction costs
- Foreign prices respond more: about 10% (normalized) against roughly 3–4% at home
- Possible reasons: higher climate awareness among foreign buyers, stricter foreign regulation, or amplification by other variables such as exchange-rate risk

**CPU shocks raise domestic turnover and prices, and foreign prices are the most sensitive.**


## How much of the variation does the CPU shock explain?

| Horizon (months) | $t_t$ | $t_t^*$ | $w_t$ | $h_t$ | $\pi_t$ | $\pi_t^*$ |
|------------------|-------|---------|-------|-------|---------|-----------|
| 1                | 29.20 | 12.80   | 9.83  | 16.66 | 35.90   | 27.38     |
| 6                | 36.35 | 13.39   | 10.00 | 16.19 | 35.12   | 29.90     |
| 12               | 35.18 | 13.82   | 10.00 | 16.10 | 34.39   | 29.04     |

Notes: Median share (%) of forecast error variance explained by the CPU shock.

- **Largest** for domestic turnover and home prices (about 29% and 36% at one month); foreign prices 27%
- **Smaller** for non-domestic turnover (12.8%), hours (16.7%) and wages (9.8%)
- Shares change little from one to twelve months; domestic turnover rises from 29% to 35%, which the paper reads as lagged adjustment

# Historical decomposition: CPU shocks and past fluctuations



Notes: Bars: median contribution of the CPU shock; line: the series, in p.p. deviations.

- **Procyclical:** contributions fall when the series falls, rise when it rises
- **Domestic turnover:** about a third of the variation in 2007, 2009 and mid-2022 (paper)
- **Prices:** negative contributions in 2007 and 2009; minimal in 2010–2012
- **Non-domestic turnover:** modest, in line with the wide IRF bands

# The CPU contribution changes sign over the sample

## Early sample

- CPU shocks **dampened** domestic turnover and output prices
- The paper links the 2007 and 2009 price falls to events such as scrutiny of biofuel viability and the US policy shift
- During 2010–2012 the contribution is minimal, amid the Portuguese debt crisis

## Later sample

- The negative contributions recede and turn **positive**; in the figure, clearest in 2021–22
- The paper attributes this to the rise of sustainability-focused firms and investment in low-carbon technology
- CPU is linked to global events such as COP26 and to domestic carbon and car tax changes

**CPU has been a key driver of historical variations in the energy sector, and its sign has shifted.**

## Robustness: results hold in sign, with some loss of precision

- **Recursive (Cholesky) identification:** more optimistic and more persistent effects on domestic turnover and both prices; wages remain insignificant
- **Model specification:** real effective exchange rate added; exogenous variable dropped; 4, 1 and 12 lags; alternative priors and hyperparameters; identity  $S_0$ ; linear trend; no constant; 5% correlation threshold
- **Pandemic and war** excluded: the domestic-turnover and home-price responses shrink in the paper's figure

### Paper's assessment

The tests are consistent and the main finding remains unchanged. In the figures, the sign of the domestic-turnover and price responses is generally kept, but several variants have bands that include zero for home prices.

Cholesky

Pandemic, war

Lags

Priors

Exog., threshold

- **Non-linearities:** the SVAR may not capture non-linear effects of global crises; the paper leaves this for future research
- **Imprecise responses:** non-domestic turnover has wide bands and hours worked is only marginally significant
- **Identification:** the recursive alternative gives more optimistic and persistent effects
- **Interpretation:** the channels behind the responses are offered as likely explanations (for example, investment in low-carbon technology or wait-and-see behaviour)
- **Scope:** one country; the paper expects the findings to apply most to countries with a mix of energy sources undergoing transitions, but size and mechanisms may vary with energy market liberalization and economic structure

# Conclusion

1. CPU shocks have a **significant impact** on Portugal's energy industry; most sensitive are domestic turnover and output prices at home and abroad
2. Prices rise in both markets, **more so abroad**; wages are unchanged, hours worked rise only marginally
3. CPU shocks contributed to the ups and downs of the sector over time
4. Policy: **predictable climate policy** limits the negative effects of uncertainty
5. Next: non-linearities from global crises, other industries, other countries

Thank you!

hmarao@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt

# Backup

---

# CPU index: keyword groups

## Climate (C)

“carbon dioxide”, “CO2”, “carbon emissions”,  
“carbon neutrality”, “carbon neutral”, “CO2  
reduction”, “carbon reduction”, “greenhouse  
gases”, “greenhouse effect”, “global warming”,  
“acid rain”, “climate”, “renewable energy”,  
“green energy”, “wind energy”, “solar energy”,  
“solar panel/s”

## Policy (P)

“parliament”, “government”, “ministry of  
finance”, “environmental fund”,  
“European Commission”, “deficit”,  
“budget”, “tax/es”, “legislation”,  
“standards”, “normatives”, “regulations”,  
“rules”, “laws”

## Uncertainty (U)

“uncertain”, “uncertainty”,  
“instability”, “unpredictability”,  
“unstable”, “indefiniteness”,  
“insecurity”, “doubt”, “indecision”,  
“risk/s”

An article counts if it contains at least one keyword from each group.

## Data description and sources

| Label     | Description                                    | Source       |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| $S_t$     | Climate policy uncertainty in Portugal         | Morão (2025) |
| $t_t$     | Index of domestic turnover in industry         | INE/own      |
| $t_t^*$   | Index of non-domestic turnover in industry     | INE/own      |
| $w_t$     | Index of gross wages and salaries in industry  | INE/own      |
| $h_t$     | Index of hours worked in industry              | INE/own      |
| $\pi_t$   | Index of output prices (home)                  | INE/own      |
| $\pi_t^*$ | Index of output prices (foreign)               | INE/own      |
| $epu_t$   | Economic policy uncertainty index for Portugal | Morão (2024) |


Notes: Monthly series. Labels follow the definitions in the paper's text.

# Hyperparameters

|             | Value  | Description                  | Observation                     |
|-------------|--------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| $\rho$      | 1      | autoregressive coefficients  | used in all models              |
| $\lambda_1$ | 0.1    | overall tightness            | 1000 in one check, 1 in another |
| $\lambda_2$ | 0.5    | cross-variable weighting     | 2 in one check                  |
| $\lambda_3$ | 1      | lag decay                    | used in all models              |
| $\lambda_4$ | $10^5$ | exogenous variable tightness | used in all models              |

*Notes:* Values commonly reported in the literature, as stated in the paper.


# Recursive (Cholesky) identification versus the proxy



Notes: Main (black, shaded 68% bands) and recursive ordering (green). The figure is normalized differently from the baseline IRF figure (domestic turnover about 10% on impact).

The recursive model gives more persistent effects on domestic turnover and both prices; non-domestic turnover gains significance in the first months; wages remain insignificant.


# Excluding the pandemic or the war




Notes: Main (black, shaded 68% bands), without the pandemic (green) and without the war (red), as labelled in the figure.

In the figure, the domestic-turnover and home-price responses are visibly smaller when the pandemic is removed.

# Lag length: 4 and 12 lags




Notes: BVAR(4), lag length chosen by AIC.




Notes: BVAR(12).

Main (black, shaded) against the alternative lag length (green). A BVAR(1) is also in the paper's appendix.

# Alternative priors




Notes: Normal-Wishart prior.



Notes: Normal-diffuse prior.


Main (black, shaded) against the alternative prior (green). More prior variants are in the paper's appendix.

# No exogenous variable and a 5% correlation threshold



Notes: Model excluding the exogenous variable.

Main (black, shaded) against the alternative (green).



Notes: Identification with a 5% correlation threshold.

## References i

-  Apergis, Nicholas, Konstantinos Gavriilidis, and Rangan Gupta (2023). **“Does climate policy uncertainty affect tourism demand? Evidence from time-varying causality tests”**. In: *Tourism Economics* 29.6, pp. 1484–1498. ISSN: 13548166. DOI: 10.1177/13548166221110540.
-  Baker, Scott R., Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (2016). **“Measuring economic policy uncertainty”**. In: *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 131.4, pp. 1593–1636. ISSN: 15314650. DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjw024.
-  Dieppe, Alistair, Romain Legrand, and Björn Van Roye (2016). **“The BEAR toolbox”**. In: *ECB Working paper series* 1934. URL: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1934.en.pdf?4c09bd3d9f294ae6b8111b8a59b8cea8>.
-  Gao, Jing and Lei Zhang (2023). **“Climate Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment: Evidence From the U.S. Tourism and Hospitality Sector”**. In: *Journal of Travel Research*. ISSN: 15526763. DOI: 10.1177/00472875221149319.

## References ii

-  Gavriilidis, Konstantinos (2021). **“Measuring Climate Policy Uncertainty”**.
-  Huang, Tao and Zeyu Sun (2023). **“Climate policy uncertainty and firm investment”**. In: *International Journal of Finance and Economics*. ISSN: 10991158. DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.2881.
-  Huo, Mengjun, Chao Li, and Renhuai Liu (2023). **“Climate policy uncertainty and corporate green innovation performance: From the perspectives of organizational inertia and management internal characteristics”**. In: *Managerial and Decision Economics*. ISSN: 10991468. DOI: 10.1002/mde.3981.
-  Khalil, Makram and Felix Strobel (2023). **“Capital Reallocation Under Climate Policy Uncertainty”**. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4560230>.
-  Kilian, Lutz, Michael D. Plante, and Alexander W. Richter (2022). **“Macroeconomic Responses to Uncertainty Shocks: The Perils of Recursive Orderings”**. In: *SSRN Electronic Journal*. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4295575.

## References iii

-  Lasisi, Lukman, Philip C. Omoke, and Afees A. Salisu (2022). **“Climate Policy Uncertainty and Stock Market Volatility”**. In: *Asian Economics Letters* 4.Early View. DOI: 10.46557/001c.37246.
-  Litterman, Robert B. (1986). **“A statistical approach to economic forecasting”**. In: *Journal of Business and Economic Statistics* 4.1, pp. 1–4. ISSN: 15372707. DOI: 10.1080/07350015.1986.10509485.
-  Ludvigson, Sydney C., Sai Ma, and Serena Ng (2021). **“Uncertainty and Business Cycles: Exogenous Impulse or Endogenous Response?”** In: *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 13.4, pp. 369–410. ISSN: 19457715. DOI: 10.1257/mac.20190171.
-  Mao, Ke and Junxin Huang (2022). **“How Does Climate Policy Uncertainty Affect Green Innovation? Evidence from China”**. In: *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 19.23. ISSN: 16604601. DOI: 10.3390/ijerph192315745.
-  Morão, Hugo (2024). **“An economic policy uncertainty index for Portugal”**. In: *International Economics*, p. 100481. ISSN: 21107017. DOI: 10.1016/j.inteco.2024.100481.

-  Morão, Hugo (2025). **“The macroeconomic effects of climate policy uncertainty: Evidence from Portugal”**. In: *Journal of Economic Asymmetries* 32. ISSN: 17034949. DOI: 10.1016/j.jeca.2025.e00426.
-  Salisu, Afees, Philip Omoke, and Olalekan Fadiya (2023). **“Climate Policy Uncertainty and Crude Oil Market Volatility”**. In: *Energy Research Letters* 4.1. ISSN: 26526433. DOI: 10.46557/001c.38781.
-  Wang, Jiawei (2022). **“Climate Policy Uncertainty and Firm Pollutant Emissions”**. In: *SSRN Electronic Journal*. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4028885.
-  Wu, Xinyu, Xuebao Yin, and Xueting Mei (2022). **“Forecasting the Volatility of European Union Allowance Futures with Climate Policy Uncertainty Using the EGARCH-MIDAS Model”**. In: *Sustainability (Switzerland)* 14.7. ISSN: 20711050. DOI: 10.3390/su14074306.

## References v

-  Xiao, Jihong and Hong Liu (2022). **“The Time-Varying Impact of Uncertainty on Oil Market Fear: Does Climate Policy Uncertainty Matter?”** In: *SSRN Electronic Journal*. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4214255.
-  Yu, Jiasheng et al. (2023). **“Dynamic Effects of Climate Policy Uncertainty on Green Bond Volatility: An Empirical Investigation Based on TVP-VAR Models”**. In: *Sustainability* 15.2, p. 1692. DOI: 10.3390/su15021692.
-  Zhu, Ning et al. (2023). **“The Response of Corporate Innovation to Climate Policy Uncertainty: Evidence from China”**. In: *Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management* 25.2. ISSN: 14643332. DOI: 10.1142/S1464333223500084.